fORUM STRUCTURE

The CDRANet Policy Forum is where the policy communication work of this group takes pace, connected by workgroups, side meetings, and conferences. Over 275 high-level CDR and climate leaders and experts are part of this group, representing a wide range of perspectives from across the globe–20 different stakeholder groups in all, from 200 institutions and 35 countries.

  • CDR business leaders

  • Finance and investment leaders

  • Science and technology researchers

  • Environmental advocacy leaders

  • Government policy experts (international, federal, state, local)

  • Climate change communication experts

benfits for The world

  • Creating new lines of peer-to-peer high level dialogue and collaboration between different leaders in this space, spanning stakeholder groups, sectors and regions.

  • Creating a truly global, multi-stakeholder framework for what CDR policy might look like—not necessarily detailed down to the nuts and bolts, but expert, diverse, and thoughtful to the point where governments at all levels can built on this and adapt policies that fit their needs.

  • Helping mainstream the conversation about CDR so it isn’t a policy sideshow, and so it is less likely to get derailed by politicians who are afraid there hasn’t been a global conversation to-date about CDR.

WORKGROUPS

Workgroups are the centerpiece of CDRANet’s work. Each group tackles a topic, and reports its recommendations to the full group for consideration.

  • What is the current state of CDR science and tech? Do we know enough to get underway? To accomplish our goals?
  • What are we missing? Are there any major missing pieces of knowledge? How about definitions? Are these clear enough (are we all working from the same dictionary when it comes to defining CDR)? How critical are these missing pieces to deploying the right solutions, and how do we get the information we need in a timely manner (and/or what is a realistic timeline for getting these answers)?

  • What does full scale deployment look like? How much CO2 extraction are we aiming for? Is it better to build our capacity for dealing with worst-case projections (so, the capacity to extract 10+ gigatons annually), or just the bare minimum (1-2 Gt annually)? How much CDR needs to be deployed to meet these goals, via what kinds of solutions, how is it distributed, and how is it sustained (which depends on how much we’re extracting)? Is there a scale at which deployment of CDR is so large it has large negative consequences on ecological and human health?
  • What does ideal look like? Do we try to roll temperatures back to 1900? 1950? Who decides what’s ideal and how do we go about having this conversation? And what are our expectations from these actions? Will ocean currents and weather patterns revert to normal in years? Decades? Is “normal” even good (i.e., how thick do we need the ice shelves to be, and what is the right temperature for the Gulf of Mexico, etc.)?
  • How about other temperature-reduction ideas? Do we build a policy that also embraces other needs and strategies for reducing global temperatures? In particular, where does methane mitigation fit in? How about solar radiation management? Refreezing the arctic ice?
  • How do we weigh reuse, or do we (like oil companies reusing some CO2 for more drilling, or biomass being used for energy production)? Is this okay so long as the result is net negative, or does this movement (and the public) demand solutions that are more ideologically “pure” (i.e., that make a sharp break from fossil fuels)? CDR can create more clean power, greener asphalt, and cleaner environments, but is valuing these a distraction or a core consideration?

  • What is mission-critical over the next 12 months? What needs to happen now, and what can wait until later?
  • Should we prioritize the development and deployment of one solution over another? Or maybe phase development/deployment, beginning with some solutions and including others later? The are many possible considerations here, like identifying which solutions are ready to go now versus those that are still being piloted (or even still in concept stage), and weighing whether some solutions are too risky to develop right now (without more research first), or too expensive, too power hungry, or have better ROI, better extractive potential, shorter permitting times, quicker public acceptance, and so on. Do we let the marketplace sort all this out, or should policymakers put their thumb on the scale in the interest of speeding up deployment and helping the marketplace focus more quickly?
  • Do we use multi-level interventions (global, regional, national, local), and engage different sectors, or is this an industry/market-led approach, or is it led by just a handful of countries who each go their own way?

  • How do we keep track of how much CO2 is extracted and how much needs to be extracted? What kind of central reporting authority do we need to maintain, and what systems are needed for matching up reporting with reality? Who verifies capture quality and how? (There are already a bevy of quality assurance companies. Should these be subject to some standard? Note that almost all novel CDR methods currently lack internationally agreed-upon approaches to monitoring, reporting and verification) And how do we account for re-release?
  • What removal and sequestration standards will work best in the marketplace? On the one hand, there seems to be a general consensus that longer sequestration is better, and that some kinds of CDR count (like DAC) while other kinds (like DAC to fuel) do not count. Is this the best approach? For instance, is it better to establish defined standards for what’s “acceptable,” or should we take every ounce of CDR we can get and let the marketplace figure out how this removal combines to achieve our net-negative goals?
  • What more do we need to support MRV work? Data warehouses, standards working groups, open research libraries? How about missing tech? For example, do we have the technology (and is it deployed) to be able to observe and measure the CDR from forestation, or underlying carbon stock exchanges?

  • How do we ensure that an enhanced focus on carbon dioxide removal doesn’t displace attention to other environmental goals like mitigation, adaptation, and conservation? There are implicit economic assumptions that we should rely on CDR because it is cheaper than decarbonization, so how do we ensure that removal becomes part of the conversation without overtaking the conversation? At minimum, removal, mitigation and adaptation (including disaster preparedness) need to work hand-in-hand because the world is going to get worse before it gets better, and because removal alone cannot save us from C02 overload.
  • How do we build an integrated global policy? What is the role of existing international policy frameworks in CDRANet’s work? Do we build on these policies or start from scratch and try to incorporate helpful elements where possible (especially considering that key EU and UN policies in particular can be prone to including ideological preconditions; is it better to accept these, work around them, or start over)? And do we fully understand how sectoral policies and regulations in areas like agriculture, industrial decarbonization, forestry, buildings and power interact and intersect with CDR policy?

  • What are the social, environmental, and economic risks and tradeoffs of moving forward with a relatively rapid and large-scale CDR rollout versus waiting until, say, 10 years from now? Is it possible to build policy that acknowledges the myriad risks of moving fast, while at the same time building in safeguards? Or should we?
  • What are the risks of failing in our task to build a better future for CDR? What if private financing dries up, buyers never materialize, and/or the public fails to accept the need for CDR? Is CDR dead at that point?
  • CDR is going to compete for attention with climate policies like adaptation, resilience and disaster preparedness, mitigation and decarbonization. Unpack what risks this might pose in terms of which policies may or may emerge victorious from this conflict? What will it mean for our climate (and our CDR efforts) if friendly fire damages one or all components of a comprehensive climate portfolio?
  • What are the ethical dimensions of CDR? Who are the winners and losers if different CDR technologies are deployed at various scales? Is this a net positive for environmental social justice? Farming? Sociopolitical stability? What does CDR mean for current versus future generations?
  • Is there a ranked risk approach? All things considered, are there more risks with certain approaches, or in using of certain approaches in certain regions—for example, hypothetically, deploying DAC in agricultural belts or mCDR solutions in fishing, coastal, or coral zones? Is the right approach to learn as we go along, make corrections, and scale accordingly (versus waiting until we know everything before acting)? Or should we scale more aggressively now with the lowest risk options? Or both?

  • What role should communication, education and outreach play this effort? Is negative public perception holding back growth of the carbon market and acceptance of CDR by policymakers? If so, is this perception justified, and can we ensure that communication is a two-way street? That is, how can we co-develop CDR approaches, scaling and deployment with communities to ensure it meets their needs and is done in an acceptable way, while at the same time ensuring our carbon removal goals can be pursued expeditiously?
  • How do we listen and teach at the same time? What kinds of listening and teaching efforts and resources are needed for the public? Policymakers? Politicians? Do we stay focused just on the technical elements of CDR and the core need for CDR, or is it fair/honest to also highlight the co-benefits of CDR for some regions (like cleaner air and more forests), or economic advantages (like more CDR-related jobs)?

  • What is the current state of the carbon market? No one knows for sure, and that’s a problem. What do we need to start tracking this market more effectively? At present, our understanding of the market is squishy, relying on estimates based on journal reports, patents, R&D investments, and press announcements. Do we need to construct a centralized reporting system to keep better tabs on how this market is evolving? Or is the data already out there in lots of different locations just waiting to be pulled together more effectively? What fields will need to be better identified before we can do better, like distinguishing removal credits from credits from avoidance credits?
  • How do we attract new buyers and build a robust and self-sustaining carbon market? What national laws and policies are needed to encourage/require more carbon buying/selling? What answers can be provided to several sticking points to growth, like dispelling negative impressions of CDR among business leaders and the public, lowering the unit costs of carbon removal, differentiating between different types of carbon credits (e.g., emission avoidance vs. emission reduction), getting government more involved in buying/trading their own emissions, understanding and promoting the non-CO2 benefits of CDR (like improved biodiversity, land use, and sustainable development), and developing a strategy for transitioning from voluntary to compliance markets?
  • Who decides what carbon credits are for sale? Should all types of credits be available or only those with 100-year-plus permanence? That is, forest credits aren’t the same as CDR credits, for example, so should these be priced differently (or not sold at all in some markets)? What role does the carbon insurance market play here (e.g., forest credits can be cheaper but since they carry more risk, the insurance cost will be higher).
  • How do we minimize fraud? The carbon offset market has been plagued by problems like additionality, permanence, over-crediting, and the dispossession of communities. How do we cure this, and how do we keep the carbon removals market from tripping over these same issues?

  • How much funding is needed to reach full scale deployment? The answer here is related to many other questions, like how much CDR we need, what kinds, the current state of the carbon market, and so on. What is the general state of the CDR finance industry, though? Is the available funding somewhat commensurate with the current level of need? What are the barriers to more (and more rapid) investment?
  • Is government playing the right role? That is, is it realistic to expect venture capital and philanthropy to assume all the risk of funding first-of-a-kind projects, or is there a gap that governments can/should fill (with moonshot haste) by helping prove the viability of projects and thereby reduce investor risk? What about the marketplace itself? Governments need to join. What are the prospects of this happening before start-ups run out of investment capital?
  • Will CDR businesses be able to stand on their own in the marketplace or will they need ongoing government subsidies? Are massive subsidies, in fact, and/or massive government investment, a safer approach over the short-term given startup and sustainability concerns?
  • What happens long-term? The CDR industry will need to ramp-up to get CO2 under control, but what happens to these businesses 50 years from now when CO2 is under control. Does the industry collapse (leading us to another CO2 removal crisis), do we phase out certain kinds of CDR approaches that are less effective, or do governments overtake (or at least finance) some of these industries to ensure a long-term presence?

  • What role do all countries have in deploying CDR solutions? CDR solutions can create different co-benefits for different parts of the world—planting forests and grasslands in some barren regions, for example. As well, some DAC solutions (like Climework’s) operate more efficiently in cold weather regions. Should we focus our approach on finding and deploying these optimal solution-region pairings? Is there a role for all countries and regions to play with all CDR solutions?
  • What role does the international community have in approving CDR solutions? Most of the action and investment in CDR is coming from the US and EU at the moment. It would obviously be best for CDR to be a global effort, but if it can’t be in short order, is it okay for CDR work to move forward asap as a coalition of the willing instead of waiting for decades more for this to be a truly global undertaking? The same question applies for IGOs such as the UN. Say, for example, that the UN can’t endorse rapid, wide-scale action on CDR for another 10 years still. Does this matter? Can the global solution space advance without the UN, if need be?

  • Who “owns” and regulates this effort? Should it be UN-led, industry/marketplace led, or a state/region-level effort? How much “ownership” is actually needed to do what needs to be done? And why? For example, we don’t need special permission to put CO2 into our atmosphere. Why should we require special treaties and permissions to remove it? What is the legal basis for requiring international CDR agreements? (Noting that existing ocean pollution treaties apply to mCDR work.)
  • Are governments and IGOs even properly set up to manage the climate crisis? From country to country, one IGO to the next, and at state and local governments globally, there is no consistent approach to our climate response. Where these matters are even addressed, they may fall under the purview of an environment ministry or an energy, interior affairs, or international affairs ministry; a sustainability department or a disaster preparedness department; or a special cabinet office that draws in officials from across government. There may be a single official tasked with a range of responsibilities, including CDR, or the CDR expert may be tucked away in a technical sector completely removed from climate conversations. Would it behoove us to advocate for a more consolidated and consistent approach to CDR policymaking so that experts and officials globally can work together more effectively? Think NASA. You can’t do a moonshot if the people and resources you need are scattered across the wind.
  • In case of emergency, break glass. What are the legal risks of working outside the international treaty system if need be? This is obviously not the preferred way to operate, but if we reach a point where we need rapid action (are we there yet?) and existing treaties are too inflexible to allow action to happen, and it looks like negotiating new treaties will take many years, should there be a Plan B? For example, not all countries are signatories to international pollution treaties, and not all countries stay in these treaties once signed.
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  • How do we transform the recommendations from this group into policy? What can the organizations who are part of CDRANet do to help affect change—to help take these ideas, shape them into actionable policy, promote this policy through the appropriate channels, and help guide the rollout and management of this policy globally. What’s it going to take?
  • What is the likelihood that countries will actually implement their declared policies and scale their CDR work as needed? How can this group and its members collaborate to magnify their influence on international policymakers.

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why workgroups?

Why workgroups? For one, it’s more engaging and productive than having a general debate between 300 experts. And second, this approach is tried and tested in science and has a documented track record of success.

Between 2003 and 2017, the US National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, via a 15-year $40 million grant from the WM Keck Foundation, conducted a series of interdisciplinary workshops whose goal was to help different stakeholders in research talk to one another. Known as NAKFI, for the National Academies Keck Futures Initiative (NAKFI), this program pulled together more than 2,000 researchers and other professionals across disciplines and sectors to attend an annual “think-tank” style conferences to contemplate real-world challenges.

The format of these conferences was unique. Rather than sit everyone in an audience to listen to presentations from panelists, NAKFI conferences were structured around 10-12 person workgroups. The composition of each workgroup was diverse, typically consisting of one representative from each stakeholder group for the research question at hand; a typical workgroup, for example, might include one physicist, one mathematician, and one geneticist, biologist, engineer, policy expert, and so on. The goal of each group wasn’t to solve its research question, but to encourage broader and more interdisciplinary ways of thinking and collaborating.

In 2016 and 2017, the Science Communication Institute (SCI) expanded on the NAKFI model for its Open Scholarship Initiative (OSI), a global group of 450 leaders in scholarly communication working together to improve the future of open research. Rather than posing hypothetical questions to workgroups, OSI teams tackled real questions, and rather than having their answers filed away, answers were instead synthesized into reports and policy recommendations for the United Nations and other global organizations.

Today with CDRANet, SCI is expanding on this model even more. Our group includes not only all key stakeholder groups, but also many agencies and policy experts who thoroughly understand and are connected to the routes policy proposals follow from creation through implementation. Our hope with CDRANet is that the interdisciplinary workgroups we create will not only come up with brilliant answers to vexing questions, but that these answers will quickly find their way into the right channels so the fruits of this group’s labor will be recognized and amplified.

GOALS